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The purpose of this article is to develop practical measures of the change in
economic welfare due to coastal land use restrictions. The measures are practical
because they may be derived from current market data at modest cost and may
be interpreted in a manner that is useful for coastal policy.
By coastal land use restrictions I mean any zoning laws that limits the amount
of undeveloped land abutting a body of water that may be used for future resi-
dential and commercial development. Such restrictions are achieved by desig-
nating areas where development is forbidden or where development is allowed
at only low densities.' The purpose of such restrictions is to preserve the natural
cover of the coastal area and thereby protect plant and wildlife habitats, maintain
the aesthetic quality of the area, and to a lesser extent reduce runoff pollutants.^
Examples of such restrictions include the California Coastal Commission's per-
mitting rules and the Critical Areas Commission's (Maryland) restricted use rules
for the Chesapeake Bay.
There are essentially three major efficiency effects of such restrictions. On
the positive side is the preservation of amenity and environmental goods that are
enjoyed by nearby residents, visitors, those with existence values, and some com-
mercial interests. On the negative side is decreased residential and commercial
proximity to the coast—fewer individuals and businesses can locate near the
coastline. Last, and also on the negative side, is a potential loss of amenities and
environmental quality at inland locations. With greater development in inland
' Coastal land use restrictions usually include guidelines for use of coastal land developed
before the restrictions are in place and for use of land for which development will be
permitted. For example, in residential areas these guidelines may include things such as
landscaping requirements, prohibition of septic tanks, limited use of fertilizers, and setback
requirements, in agricultural areas this might include limited use of fertilizers and pesti-
cides, prohibition of certain types of tillage practices, setback requirements, and so forth.
For the purposes of my analysis these guidelines are ignored.
^ Whether the restrictions will achieve such goals is uncertain. Agricultural land use may
contribute more to run-off pollutants than residential use. If restrictions encourage agri-
cultural uses and discourage residential uses, there may be a net increase in run-off pol-
lutants due to the restrictions.
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areas there is potential for increased density and less preservation of inland natural
sites.-'
I show that market information in current housing markets is sufficient to
estimate an upperbound measure for the second of these three effects—the loss
in proximity to the coast. 1 do so for the loss in residential proximity only. In
concept the analysis is the same for commercial proximity but is typically more
difficult to apply due to lack of data." I use a hedonic price method to infer a
price (or demand function) for proximity per residential unit. The number of dis-
placed units is approximated using information on the number of acres placed in
restricted status and the expected number of units to be developed per acre.
Roughly, multiplying the price by the estimated number of displaced units gives
my approximation for the aggregate loss. In this article I establish the theoretical
basis for this efficiency measure using Rosen's (1974) hedonic price model and
argue why it is an upperbound estimate of the true change in welfare.
The literature on measuring the efficiency effects of land use restrictions is
small. Edwards and Anderson (1984) measure the welfare loss of residential dis-
placement from land near salt ponds in Rhode Island; Batie and Mabbs-Zeno
(1985) and Shabman and Bertelson (1979) measure the loss of displacement from
coastal wetlands in Virginia; and Brown and Pollakowski (1977) estimate the price
of residential proximity to two lakes in Seattle in a study of optimal setback
restrictions. The empirical approach in all these articles is similar to that offered
here. This article provides a theoretical basis for such analyses. It differs from
the previous articles in that it offers upperbound, not lowerbound, approximations
to the loss.^
Having a reliable upperbound is useful for establishing coastal policy. If the
expected environmental gain from restrictions exceed an upperbound measure,
decision-makers may proceed with confidence that the policy is efficient. Given
the lack of information available to guide policy in most coastal land use plans,
such a measure is a useful first step to rational decision-making.
In the following section I present a model of residential location choice with
emphasis on location in proximity to the coast. The welfare analysis is also pre-
sented in this section. In Section 3 I present two upperbound approximations for
the loss in proximity and the method for estimating these approximations.
The equity effects of such restrictions that are typically of concern to policymakers but
which are not addressed here include windfall gains to property owners that occupy coastal
land that is developed before restrictions, the loss to property owners occupying restricted
land, and the potential increase in inland land prices that may impose losses to lower
income residents.
For example, Wilman (1984) applies hedonic price methods to commercial uses (hotel
and cottage visits) in coastal areas in the context of estimating the cost of coastal beach
pollution.
There are several other related studies. Milon (1984) estimates the value of coastal
proximity on a barrier island on the Florida coast but does not use it in the context of land
use restrictions. Freeh and Lafferty (1976) present the first theoretical discussion of the
economic effects of coastal land use restrictions, and in a later article (1984) estimate the
effect of land use restrictions on land values. Similar studies analyzing the effect of land
use restrictions on land values but not in the context of coastal housing markets are Rueter
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Model and Welfare Analysis^
I consider a simple model of a coastal land market. All land is used for either
residential housing or open space. All land is owned by landlords and rented to
renters with housing or is held as open space. (A landowner who resides on his
or her own property may be thought of as both a landlord and a renter.) A renter
chooses one house to maximize utility, and a landlord provides housing to max-
imize profit. Implicit in a renter's choice is the selection of the locational attributes
of the land—proximity to workcenters, shopping areas, parks, and coastline, qual-
ity of neighborhood and public services, and so on—and the selection of the
structural attributes of the house—size, age, presence of garage, and so on.
Implicit in the land market then is a market for each of these attributes. Fol-
lowing this reasoning, the coastal land use restrictions are simply regulations in
the implicit market for locational attributes pertaining to proximity to the coast-
line. The regulations alter the supply of these attributes of proximity. .
I define x as a vector of housing attributes (all measured as goods, so larger
X is better), U as utility for a renter, P as rental price for housing for a year, y
as renter income, z as a numeraire good with price equal 1, and s as a vector of
renter characteristics. A renter's choice of housing is an implicit choice of x and
along with a choice of z solves the problem
Maximize {U(x, z, s)| P(x; 3) + z = y} (1)
P(x;P) is a hedonic price function. The first order conditions are
VxP (2)
where Vx is the gradient with respect to x. I define the renter's marginal rate of
substitution function for attribute i in x with respect to z as mi(x, z, s). In
equilibrium
mi(.) = (au/axi)/(au/az) = sp/axi for all i (3)
A renter maximizes utility by setting its marginal value of Xi equal to the implicit
price of Xi for all i attributes.
Landlords take the hedonic price function as fixed and rent to renters so as
to maximize profits. Since the landlord problem is not likely to be of relevance
in measuring the efficiency effects of the land use restrictions, it is not presented.
Why this is so is discussed below.
I assume that there are two types of coastline: preserved and developed. Land
use density requirements define my two types of coastline. If restrictions set aside
areas where density may be no greater than one housing structure per 20 acres,
preserved coastline is any land with less than this density. Developed coastline
is all land with greater than this density. By assumption all developed coastal
areas are the same, and all preserved coastal areas are the same.
* This section is developed from the work of Parsons (1986), Bartik (1987a), and Horowitz
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I assume that proximity to each of these coastlines is measured by four lo-
cational attributes: distance to the coast, view of the coast, frontage on the coast,
and coastal privileges.^ These attributes are included in the vector x. I define the
set of proximity variables for the developed coast as d, the set of proximity vari-
ables for the preserved coast as p, and all other attributes as a. So my vector x
= (d, p, a).
Land in developed portions of the coast has large d values and low p values.
The low p values here recognize that preserved coastline may affect land values
in neighboring developed coastal areas. Land near preserved coastline has large
p values and low d values. Inland land has low d and p values.
I assume that without restrictions the portion of coastal land that is developed
increases over time. With land use restrictions the rate at which conversion from
preserved to develop occurs is reduced. Indeed, this is the purpose of such re-
strictions. Thus, in any given year following the restrictions the supply of d is
reduced and supply of p is increased relative to the case with no restrictions.
Consider a year following the restrictions. The change in supply of proximity
attributes alters the equilibrium values of 3 in the hedonic price function—renters
face higher implicit prices for d and lower implicit prices for p than without the
restrictions. Define Ap as the change in p due to the restrictions for the year.
With p + Ap instead of p in the budget constraint, renters select a different
X to maximize utility. Of course there is less housing immediately abutting the
coast with than without the restrictions, so for many renters d is smaller. But
there is also more housing in and near coastline with more open space, so for
many renters p is larger. Undoubtedly renters adjust their choice of other attri-
butes as well. Renters consume more of attributes that substitute for d and com-
plement p, and less of attributes that substitute for p and complement d.
For example, renters that select proximity to a developed coastline when there
are no land use restrictions may select proximity to an inland amenity such as a
park or river as a substitute for the coast when there are land use restrictions.
Some renters may substitute private goods such as improved yardspace or a pool.
On the other hand these same attributes may substitute for proximity to the pre-
served coast. In any case the renter's choice changes due to the land use restric-
tions and it is certain to include more than changes in just d and p.
I define the change in the choice attributes due to the land use restrictions for
a given renter as Ax = (Ad, Ap, Aa) and the change in the amount of land and
other goods chosen as Az. If there are N renters with nonzero Ax, then I can
write the aggregate loss in proximity to developed coast as SjAdj = AD, where
j = 1, . . . , N. Similarly, I can write AP as the total gain in proximity to preserved
coast, and AA as the total change in other attributes.
For a given renter in a given year the change in utility due to the land use
restrictions is U(d* + Ad, p* + Ap, a* + Aa, z*) - U(d*, p*, a*, z*) or U(x*
+ Ax, z*) - U(x*, z*). The * denotes attribute levels chosen without the re-
strictions. I assume Az = 0 for ease of presentation. Now, the renter is certain
to realize a change in the rental price of land as well. But, any increase in price
that reduces renter welfare increases landlord welfare by the same amount. The
^ Coastal privileges are rights to beach access at privately owned waterfront property.
Often such rights "run with the land." That is, landowners at designated locations have
the access rights, and these rights are transferred with sale of the property.Welfare Effects of Coastal Land Use Restrictions 115
same is true for any decrease in the price. Thus, for the purposes of analyzing
efficiency effects I can ignore changes in welfare that result from changes in land
prices. Hereafter the change in welfare to renters that I refer to is net of transfers
from or to landlords. Unless there is a change in a landlord's cost of providing
structural attributes of housing there are no other welfare changes.
The renter's compensating variation is the amount of AZ that solves U(x* +
Ax, z* -I- AZ) = U(x*, z*). It is the amount of change in z that holds utility
constant when attribute selection changes with the land use restrictions.
Following Horowitz (1984) I know that
AZ = Z(x* + Ax, s) - Z(x*, s) (4)
Z(x, s) is the implicit function satisfying U(x, s, Z(x, s)) = U*, where U* = U(x*,
z*, s). Z(x, s) is the amount of z given the values in (x, s) that is required to keep
the renter at the level of utility attained without the land use restrictions. It follows
that VxZ is a system of partial differential equations with the solution Z(x, s, C)
where C is just a constant of integration.
From the implicit function theorem V^Z = —V^\J*/{d\J*/dz). From Equation
(2) it follows that -mi(x, z, s) = dZldXi for all i. Thus if I have estimates of the
system of marginal rate of substitution functions, I can solve this system of partial
differential equations (practically this may be difficult but in concept possible) for
Z(.) which in turn may be used to calculate the welfare measure in expression
(4). The annual aggregate change in welfare due to the restriction is simply SjAZj,
where j = 1, . . . , N, and N is the set of all renters that change attribute selection
if land use restrictions are adopted.
Measuring change in welfare using expression (4) is impractical for two rea-
sons: (1) it is difficult to predict Ax, and (2) it is difficult to estimate the marginal
rate of substitution functions.
The difficulty in predicting Ax is obvious and is the more serious of the two
complications. For each renter that selects land attributes that are different from
the attributes that would have been selected without the restrictions, I need to
predict how their selection changes. This is not just for changes in proximity to
the coast but for changes in all attributes.
The difficulty in estimating the marginal rate of substitution functions is well
documented.* If data are gathered from a single housing market I observe each
renter at a single point on his or her marginal rate of substitution function and
hence cannot determine the shape of the functions. If data are gathered from
many segmented housing markets (markets may be segmented spatially or tem-
porally, see Schnare and Struyk (1976)) and I accept that renters with similar
preferences are located in the different markets, estimation of the functions is
possible.' That is, it would now be possible to observe renters at different points
on their marginal rate of substitution functions. This approach is often impractical
because the data required are difficult if not impossible to get and more expensive
to get than data from a single market. I need data on characteristics of buyers as
* See Epple (1987), Bartik (1987b), Diamond and Smith (1985), Mendelsohn (1984), Par-
sons (1986), and McConnell et al. (1985) for analyses of this issue.
' Diamond and Smith (1985) is a good presentation of the argument.^^6 George R. Parsons
well as land attributes and data across markets that is compiled uniformly. Fur-
thermore the assumptions pertaining to segmentation are often tenuous.
To date there are no marginal rate of substitution functions estimated for prox-
imity to the coastline. There are, however, several recent studies that have es-
timated marginal rate of substitution or demand functions for a variety of housing
attributes using multiple market data. These studies include Bartik (1987b),
Palmquist (1984), and Parsons (1986). For some examples of attempts to estimate
demand functions using single market data see Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978),
Nelson (1978), and Witte, Sumka, and Erickson (1979).
Given the difficulties of measuring expression (4), I consider alternative mea-
sures that require less information to estimate. These alternatives approximate
the true change in welfare.
Practical Measures Using Incomplete Information
Introduction
I consider two common situations in which information is insufficient for esti-
mating expression (4). In the first situation I have sufficient information to estimate
marginal rate of substitution functions for d, and in the second I have sufficient
information to estimate only the hedonic price function including d and a in the
market without the restrictions in place. In both situations I cannot predict Ax
for individual renters, but I can predict the number of renters that would have
located in a restricted coastal area had that area not been restricted. In both
situations I cannot measure the attribute for proximity to the preserved coast-
line—p in X. (This is common because current residential housing is often not
found near preserved coastal areas unless restrictions already exist.)
For both cases I have sufficient information for upperbound estimates of the
change in welfare given by expression (4). The estimates are upperbounds es-
sentially because I am only able to consider the loss in welfare due to AD. For
this reason the upperbound measures may be thought of as upperbounds on the
opportunity costs of the restrictions or upperbounds on the total loss of proximity
to the developed coast.
Two Upperbound Measures
I consider four measures of welfare in developing the upperbound estimates. The
measures, expressed by either the function W(.) or V(.), are given in Table 1.
(Recall that Z(.) is a renter's compensating variation for a change in x measured
in terms of z.) Each measure is for the aggregate change in welfare for one year
due to the land use restrictions. W(N, AX) is the true change in welfare; it is the
total change in welfare for the set of N renters for the change AX. Recall that N
is the set of all renters with nonzero Ax. The other measures are interpreted
similarly. W(N, AD) is the total change in welfare for the set of N renters for the
change AD only. W(M, AD) and V(M, AD) are the proposed upperbound mea-
sures. V(.) is a measure of welfare that does not use the Z(.) function presented
in the previous section. The set M used in both upperbounds is defined next.
Assume for the moment that there is no change in the number of renters in
the market as a result of land use restrictions. If so, there are say M fewer rentersWelfare Effects of Coastal Land Use Restrictions 117
Table 1
Four Measures of Aggregate Welfare Change
Due to Coastal Land Use Restrictions
True change in welfare (change in welfare due to AX for N renters):
N
W(N, AX) = 2 {Zj(x* + Ax) - Zj(x*)}
j
Change in welfare due only to AD for N renters:
W(N, AD) = X {Zj(d* + Ad, p*, a*) - Zj(d*, p*, a*)}
j
Change in welfare due only to AD which is assumed to be realized entirely by
the M renters displaced from the restricted area:
M
W(M, AD) = 2 {Zk(d* + Ad', p*, a*) - Zk(d*, p*, a*)}
k
Change in welfare due only to AD for M renters using implicit prices for proximity
near the coast:
M
V(M, AD) = 2 {(VdP(XJ) • Ada
k
N = Number of renters that change attribute selection with restrictions (j = 1, . . . ,
N)
M = Number of renters displaced from restricted zone (k = 1, . . . , M)
X = (d, p, a)
AX = 2r(Adj,Ap
AD = SfAdj =
in the restricted area than would have been developed without the restrictions
and M more in the nonrestricted area than would have been the case without the
restrictions. The set M is that set of renters that locate in the restricted area if
there are no restrictions but locate outside the area if there are restrictions. Denote
these renters by their characteristics as Sk, where k = 1, . . . , M. Let Adk be
the k"^ renter's change in proximity to the developed coastline as a result of the
restrictions.
Recall that 2j Adj = AD, the aggregate loss in proximity to developed coastline.
It follows that SkAdk ^ AD, because there is some nonzero Ad for renters that
are not in the set M. This implies that it is possible to divide AD into M units
such that each of the units, Adk, satisfies Adk ^ Adk and XkAdk = AD.
Now consider the upperbound measure presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: W(M, AD) < W(N, AX)
W(N, AX) is the true change in welfare. W(M, AD) is the change in welfare
due only to the total loss in proximity to the developed coast (AD) and assumes
the loss is born entirely by the M renters displaced from the restricted area. This118 George R. Parsons
upperbound is estimable if 1 have estimates of the marginal rate of substitution
functions for d and a.
Notice that W(N, AX) and W(M, AD) differ in three ways. First, W(N, AX)
measures the change in welfare for the change in all attributes AX. W(M, AD)
measures the change for only loss in proximity to the developed coast AD. Second,
W(N, AX) measures the change for all renters, N, that change attribute selection
with restrictions. W(M, AD) measures the change for only the set of renters, M,
that would have located in the restricted area without the restrictions. Third, in
W(N, AX) the actual change in d. Ad, is used in each of the N renter's utility
functions. In W(M, AD), Ad' is used in each of the M renter's utility functions.
Intuitively, W(M, AD) is an upperbound measure of W(N, AX) because it only
considers the negative effects on welfare (the first difference mentioned above)
and because it assumes all the negative effects are borne by a set of renters that
would suffer most from such effects (the second and third differences).
To see the effect of the first difference consider the measure W(N, AD). W(N,
AD) is the change in welfare for all relocating renters due only to the loss of
proximity to the developed coastline. It follows that W(N, AD) > W(N, AX).
That is, if I only let AD in the vector AX change, the loss in total renter welfare
is greater than if I let all the elements in AX change. I know that AP > 0, so
excluding Ap from each renter's welfare measure must reduce aggregate welfare.
AA are welfare-increasing market adjustment to the restrictions so excluding Aa
from each renter's measure of welfare change must increase the measured loss
further, even though some individual renters may have lower U(.) as a result of
Ad.'o Hence, W(N, AD) > W(N, AX).,
Next, notice that W(N, AD) distributes the lost proximity, AD, according to
intensity of preferences in the implicit market for proximity while W(M, AD)
arbitrarily takes it from a small set of renters with the most intense preferences."
Thus W (M, AD) > W(N, AD) > W(N, AX). Proposition 1 holds.
The second upperbound measure only requires an estimate of the hedonic
price function that includes d and a. That upperbound is stated in the following
proposition
Proposition 2: V(M, AD) > W(N, AX) provided VdZ(d*, as) > VdZ(d, as) for all
d < d* and for adi x and s.
The intuition of proposition 2 is that if renters' s marginal value of proximity
increases with proximity to the coast, the implicit price on the last increment of
proximity chosen without the restrictions must be an upperbound estimate of each
lost unit of proximity due to the restrictions. This measure uses the implicit price
in just this manner.
'" To see that AA is a welfare-increasing adjustment, consider the following exercise.
Imagine that I can change AD and AA in discrete steps and after each step can evaluate
the aggregate change in welfare. (This method of analysis is borrowed from Bartik (1987b)).
First, let AD change. Each renter has less d and hence a drop in welfare. Next, let AA
change. Since AA is chosen by renters in response to a change in the supply of d and p
(and since the supply of a is perfectly inelastic and unchanged with the restrictions), this
adjustment must increase aggregate welfare.
" AD may be spread across all N renters as expected will occur in the market or it may
be foisted upon the set of renters (in estimating the loss) that have the highest willingness
to pay for d. The latter measure is surely an upperbound measure of the former. 1 accept
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To see that Proposition 2 holds recall that VdZ(x*, s) = VdP(x*) for each renter.
From the proviso in Proposition 2 it follows that Zk(d* + Ad', p*, a*, s) - Zk(d*,
p*, a*, s) < VdZk(x*, s)Ad' = VdP(x*)-Ad' for all k in the set M.'^ In terms of
total welfare change this implies that W(M, AD) < V(M, AD). I know that W(N,
AX) < W(M, AD) from Proposition 1, so W(N, AX) < V(M, AD). Proposition 2
holds.
Estimation
To estimate the upperbound in Proposition 11 need estimates of the marginal rate
of substitution functions for d, a prediction of M, and predictions for Sk, d*, and
Ad' for each renter in the set M.
The marginal rate of substitution functions may be estimated using temporal
or spatial segmentation as discussed above. The system -mi(x, s) for only the
attributes in the vector d need be estimated. This, in turn, may be integrated back
to Z(.) for the welfare analysis.
M may be predicted using time-series data on the rate of coastal housing de-
velopment and acreage data for the amount of restricted land. For example if an
increase of 20% in new housing units in the coastal area is projected and there is
enough space to accommodate 5% after the restrictions, use 15% of the stock as
an estimate of the number of displaced units. Projections are made by year for
the years after the restrictions are in place, so I have Mt for t = 1, . . . , T, where
1 is the year the restrictions begin and T is the final period of the analysis. Shortly,
I show that each Mt must be divided into zones according to distance from the
waterfront. This gives M,r, for r = 1, . . . , R where r denotes one of R zones.
Values for Sk, d*, and Ad' must be predicted for each renter in each set M,r.
For Sk use the average characteristics of current renters that choose large values
of d, that is, the average characteristics of renters that are located in coastal areas
that are developed today.
The vectors d* and Ad' include four elements: view (dO, privileges (d2), front-
age (d3), and distance (d4). Divide the coastal area into zones of some arbitrary
size according to distance from the water as shown in Table 2. The entries to the
left of the curved line pertain to the zones; moving right to left a renter is located
further from the coast. The entries for each zone are the values assumed for the
vector d for a renter in the set M without restrictions. All of these renters are
displaced from proximity to a developed coast by the restrictions. The entries to
the right of the curved line pertain to the predicted location of a displaced renter
with restrictions, and assume the entire adjustment in AD is borne by renters in
the set M.
For example, a renter in a house that would have been built in zone 1 without
the restrictions would have view, privileges, the average frontage of houses cur-
rently in such areas, and the average distance to the water of houses currently
in such areas. With the restriction the renter has no view, no privileges, no front-
age, and is located at the distance d| + Ad^. d| + Ad; is the value of d4 at which
dP{x*, 3)/ad4 = 0—the distance at which nearness to the coast no longer affects
property values. Indeed, this defines my choice of Ad'. The reasoning is simply
that land must be sufficiently abundant in this area vis-a-vis the coast that Ad4 is
For elements in d that are discrete, let 3P/ad be the coefficient on the discrete attribute.120 George R, Parsons
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0 if no view
1 if privileges
0 if no privileges
= frontage (feet of land abutting water)
= average frontage for current
properties in coastal zone
= distance to waterfront
d4(i) = average distance to waterfront for current
properties in zone i
not likely to take on values that place displaced housing any further inland. Similar
assumptions for the other zones are shown.
The fmal welfare measure where 8t is a discount rate is
+ Ad;,, p*, a*, s) - Z(di^, p*, a*, s)}. W(M, AD) = St2rMtr-
Less information is needed to estimate the welfare measure in Proposition 2:
an estimate of the hedonic price function without restrictions and predictions for
Mtr and d* + Ad'.
An estimate of the hedonic price function in the coastal housing market where
the restrictions are being considered but before they are proposed may be used
for the estimate of the hedonic price function without restrictions. M,r, d*, and
Ad' predictions are the same as presented in Table 2.
The welfare measure is
V(M, AD) = 2t2r{M,r
Summary
I present two upperbound measures of welfare loss of residential displacement
due to coastal land use restrictions. One measure requires data from a singleWelfare Effects of Coastal Land Use Restrictions 121
coastal housing market with characteristics similar to that of the market for which
the restrictions are proposed. For this measure only the hedonic price function
is estimated. The other measure requires either cross-sectional or time-series data
on coastal housing markets that are segmented. For this measure a willingness
to pay function is estimated for proximity to the coast. Both measures require
prediction of the number of units displaced from the restricted coastal area.
If the expected value of environmental improvements exceed these measures
and the expected loss of displaced commercial uses and displaced environmental
stress is slight, decision-makers should favor a set of proposed land use restrictions
with confidence that the decision is efficient. If the restrictions fail such a test,
the decision-maker may consider a similar test with Edwards and Anderson's
lowerbound measure. Failure here should lead to rejection of the restrictions with
confidence of an efficient decision.
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